Requirement 3 of the Payment Card Industry's Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is to "protect stored cardholder data." The public assumes merchants and financial institutions will protect data on payment cards to thwart theft and prevent unauthorized use.
But merchants should take note: Requirement 3 applies only if cardholder data is stored. Merchants who do not store any cardholder data automatically provide stronger protection by having eliminated a key target for data thieves.
For merchants who have a legitimate business reason to store cardholder data, it is important to understand what data elements PCI DSS allows them to store and what measures they must take to protect those data. To prevent unauthorized storage, only council certified PIN entry devices and payment applications may be used.
PCI DSS compliance is enforced by the major payment card brands who established the PCI DSS and the PCI Security Standards Council: American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide and Visa Inc.
PCI DSS Requirement 3 It details technical guidelines for protecting stored cardholder data. Merchants should develop a data retention and storage policy that strictly limits storage amount and retention time to that which is required for business, legal, and/or regulatory purposes.
Sensitive authentication data must never be stored after authorization - even if this data is encrypted.
Never store full contents of any track from the card's magnetic stripe or chip (referred to as full track, track, track 1, track 2, or magnetic stripe data). If required for business purposes, the cardholder's name, PAN, expiration date, and service code may be stored as long as they are rotected in accordance with PCI DSS requirements.
Never store the card-validation code (CVV) or value (three- or four-digit number printed on the front or back of a payment card used to validate card-not-present transactions).
Never store the personal identification number (PIN) or PIN Block. Be sure to mask PAN whenever it is displayed. The first six and last four digits are the maximum number of digits that may be displayed. This requirement does not apply to those authorized with a specific need to see the full PAN, nor does it supersede stricter requirements in place for displays of cardholder data such as in a point-of-sale receipt.
PCI Data Storage
[1] These data elements must be protected if stored in conjunction with the PAN. This protection should be per PCI DSS requirements for general protection of the cardholder data environment. Additionally, other legislation (e.g., related to consumer personal data protection, privacy, identity theft, or data security) may require specific protection of this data, or proper disclosure of a company's practices if consumer related personal data is being collected during the course of business. PCI DSS, however, does not apply if PANs are not stored, processed, or transmitted.
[2] Sensitive authentication data must not be stored after authorization (even if encrypted).
[3] Full track data from the magnetic stripe, magnetic stripe image on the chip, or elsewhere.
Technical Guidelines for Protecting Stored Payment Card Data At a minimum, PCI DSS requires PAN to be rendered unreadable anywhere it is stored - including portable digital media, backup media, and in logs. Software solutions for this requirement may include one of the following:
One-way hash functions based on strong cryptography - also called hashed index, which displays only index data that point to records in the database where sensitive data actually reside.
Truncation - removing a data segment, such as showing only the last four digits.
Index tokens and securely stored pads - encryption algorithm that combines sensitive plain text data with a random key or "pad" that works only once.
Strong cryptography - with associated key management processes and procedures. Refer to the PCI DSS and PA-DSS Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms for the definition of "strong cryptography."
Some cryptography solutions encrypt specific fields of information stored in a database; others encrypt a singular file or even the entire disk where data is stored. If full-disk encryption is used, logical access must be managed independently of native operating system access control mechanisms. Decryption keys must not be tied to user accounts. Encryption keys used for encryption of cardholder data must be protected against both disclosure and misuse. All key management processes and procedures for keys used for encryption of cardholder data must be fully documented and implemented. Strong Cryptography is define in the glossary of PCI DSS as: Cryptography based on industry-tested and accepted algorithms, along with strong key lengths and proper key-management practices. Cryptography is a method to protect data and includes both encryption (which is reversible) and hashing (which is not reversible, or "one way"). Examples of industry-tested and accepted standards and algorithms for encryption include AES (128 bits and higher), TDES (minimum double-length keys), RSA (1024 bits and higher), ECC (160 bits and higher), and ElGamal (1024 bits and higher).
See NIST Special Publication 800-57 (www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/) for more information on strong crypto.
The following answers are all incorrect: Primary Account Number Cardholder Name Expiration Date All of the items above can be stored according to the PCI Data Storage Guidelines. See graphic above.
The following reference(s) were/was used to create this question: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_fs_data_storage.pdf

Explanation/Reference:
Explanation:
A padded cell system is used in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and is similar to a honeypot. When an IDS detects an intruder, that intruder is automatically transferred to a padded cell. The padded cell has the look and layout of the actual network, but within the padded cell the intruder can neither perform malicious activities nor access any confidential data.
Incorrect Answers:
A: Noise and perturbation is a database security technique of inserting fake information in the database to misdirect an attacker or cause confusion on the part of the attacker that the actual attack will not be fruitful.
B: Cell suppression is a database security technique used to hide specific cells in a database that contain information that could be used in inference attacks.
D: Partitioning is a database security technique that involves dividing the database into different parts, which makes it much harder for an unauthorized individual to find connecting pieces of data that can be brought together and other information that can be deduced or uncovered.
References:
Harris, Shon, All In One CISSP Exam Guide, 6th Edition, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2013, p. 1185 Stewart, James, Ed Tittel and Mike Chapple, CISSP: Certified Information Systems security Professional Study Guide, 5th Edition, Wiley Publishing, Indianapolis, 2011, p. 58

The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol is primarily used to provide confidentiality
to the information sent across clients and servers.
For your exam you should know the information below:
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a commonly-used protocol for managing the security of a
message transmitted over a public network such as the Internet.
SSL has recently been succeeded by Transport Layer Security (TLS), which is based on SSL.
SSL uses a program layer located between the Internet's Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and
Transport Control Protocol (TCP) layers.
SSL is included as part of both the Microsoft and Netscape browsers and most Web server
products.
Developed by Netscape, SSL also gained the support of Microsoft and other Internet client/server
developers as well and became the de facto standard until evolving into Transport Layer Security.
The "sockets" part of the term refers to the sockets method of passing data back and forth
between a client and a server program in a network or between program layers in the same
computer. SSL uses the public-and-private key encryption system from RSA, which also includes
the use of a digital certificate. Later on SSL uses a Session Key along a Symmetric Cipher for the
bulk of the data.
TLS and SSL are an integral part of most Web browsers (clients) and Web servers. If a Web site is
on a server that supports SSL, SSL can be enabled and specific Web pages can be identified as
requiring SSL access. Any Web server can be enabled by using Netscape's SSLRef program
library which can be downloaded for noncommercial use or licensed for commercial use.
TLS and SSL are not interoperable. However, a message sent with TLS can be handled by a
client that handles SSL but not TLS.
The SSL handshake
A HTTP-based SSL connection is always initiated by the client using a URL starting with https://
instead of with http://. At the beginning of an SSL session, an SSL handshake is performed. This
handshake produces the cryptographic parameters of the session. A simplified overview of how
the SSL handshake is processed is shown in the diagram below.
SSL Handshake
Image Reference - http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/tividd/td/ITAME/SC32-1363-
00/en_US/HTML/handshak.gif
The client sends a client "hello" message that lists the cryptographic capabilities of the client
(sorted in client preference order), such as the version of SSL, the cipher suites supported by the
client, and the data compression methods supported by the client. The message also contains a
28-byte random number.
The server responds with a server "hello" message that contains the cryptographic method (cipher
suite) and the data compression method selected by the server, the session ID, and another
random number.
Note:
The client and the server must support at least one common cipher suite, or else the handshake
fails. The server generally chooses the strongest common cipher suite.
The server sends its digital certificate. (In this example, the server uses X.509 V3 digital
certificates with SSL.)
If the server uses SSL V3, and if the server application (for example, the Web server) requires a
digital certificate for client authentication, the server sends a "digital certificate request" message.
In the "digital certificate request" message, the server sends a list of the types of digital certificates
supported and the distinguished names of acceptable certificate authorities.
The server sends a server "hello done" message and waits for a client response. Upon receipt of
the server "hello done" message, the client (the Web browser) verifies the validity of the server's
digital certificate and checks that the server's "hello" parameters are acceptable.
If the server requested a client digital certificate, the client sends a digital certificate, or if no
suitable digital certificate is available, the client sends a "no digital certificate" alert. This alert is
only a warning, but the server application can fail the session if client authentication is mandatory.
The client sends a "client key exchange" message. This message contains the pre-master secret,
a 46-byte random number used in the generation of the symmetric encryption keys and the
message authentication code (MAC) keys, encrypted with the public key of the server.
If the client sent a digital certificate to the server, the client sends a "digital certificate verify"
message signed with the client's private key. By verifying the signature of this message, the server
can explicitly verify the ownership of the client digital certificate.
Note:
An additional process to verify the server digital certificate is not necessary. If the server does not
have the private key that belongs to the digital certificate, it cannot decrypt the pre-master secret
and create the correct keys for the symmetric encryption algorithm, and the handshake fails.
The client uses a series of cryptographic operations to convert the pre-master secret into a master
secret, from which all key material required for encryption and message authentication is derived.
Then the client sends a "change cipher spec" message to make the server switch to the newly
negotiated cipher suite. The next message sent by the client (the "finished" message) is the first
message encrypted with this cipher method and keys.
The server responds with a "change cipher spec" and a "finished" message of its own. The SSL handshake ends, and encrypted application data can be sent.
The following answers are incorrect: FTP - File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is a standard Internet protocol for transmitting files between computers on the Internet. Like the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which transfers displayable Web pages and related files, and the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), which transfers e-mail, FTP is an application protocol that uses the Internet's TCP/IP protocols. FTP is commonly used to transfer Web page files from their creator to the computer that acts as their server for everyone on the Internet. It's also commonly used to download programs and other files to your computer from other servers.
SSH - Secure Shell (SSH) is a cryptographic network protocol for secure data communication, remote command-line login, remote command execution, and other secure network services between two networked computers. It connects, via a secure channel over an insecure network, a server and a client running SSH server and SSH client programs, respectively.
S/MIME - S/MIME (Secure Multi-Purpose Internet Mail Extensions) is a secure method of sending e-mail that uses the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman encryption system. S/MIME is included in the latest versions of the Web browsers from Microsoft and Netscape and has also been endorsed by other vendors that make messaging products. RSA has proposed S/MIME as a standard to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
Following reference(s) were/was used to create this question: CISA review manual 2014 Page number 352 Official ISC2 guide to CISSP CBK 3rd Edition Page number 256 http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/tividd/td/ITAME/SC32-1363-00/en_US/HTML/ss7aumst18.htm
Topic 3, Information Security Governence and Risk Management

Explanation/Reference:
Explanation:
Higher or equal to access class. The reason is the term dominates refers to a subject being authorized to perform an operation if the access class of the subject is higher or dominates the access class of the object requested. This is the best answer for the term "dominates" in access control. If a subject wishes to access an object, his security clearance must be equal or higher than the object he's accessing.
Incorrect Answers:
B: Rights are superceded is incorrect as it is not actually a valid condition.
C: Valid need-to-know with read privileges is too specific to be dominates, and is usually what a user's label indicates.
D: A higher clearance level than others. Although having a higher clearance level might be important to obtain access to the higher levels of data, it is not what the definition of "dominates" refers to in access control.
References: Shon Harris latest "All in One CISSP Exam Prep" page 280.